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The Impact of Slack
Resources on
High-Tech IPOs
Fariss-Terry Mousa
Richard Reed
Research on organization slack has focused mainly on Its effect in large publicly traded
firms, but little work exists on the value of slack resources for other firms. Therefore, here,
we address the question: Do slack resources matter in the case of Initial public offerings
(IPOs)? We argue that firms that possess financial, innovational, and managerial slack
resources are sending a positive signal to potential investors regarding the quality of the
IPO. Using a sample of high-tech IPOs, we find support for that contention.

Introduction
In established firms. it has been found that slack resources act as incentives to
experiment and make proactive strategic choices (George, 2005). they are deployed to
build capabilities that make firms competitive, tbey help maintain coalitions that ensure
the convergence of personal and organizational goals. and they act as buffers in periods
of economic duress (George). We argue that excess or "slack" resolln;es possessed
by firms undergoing an initial public offering (IPO) can signal the future potential of
that firm and the quality of the investment. From a resource-based perspective, slack
resources can provide a competitive advantage to new firms and. therefore, offer a
promise of superior financial performance. Because new firms have not yet demonstrated
the ability to sllccessfully handle the demands of public trading (e.g., market fluctua
tions). they are discounted by investors (Certo. 2003). Slack resources may compen
sate for this "Iiability of market newness" by reducing the risk of investment for the
purchasers of the IPO.
The main reasons why finns undertake IPO, are twofold: needing capital to bring an
invention to market. or the owners. or venture capitalists. wanting to be able to realize
tinancial gains. In the case of the latter. investors will only bc interested in making a
financial commitment if the business has the potential for generating capital gains in
stock. which. again, means bringing a viable invention to market Of capitalizing on an
existing invention. That requires having operational abilities. the ability to innovate or
generate subsequent innovations, and managers to formulate strategy and implement
Please send corrcsponth:n..:e to: Fariss~Tcn:v MUll"';], tel.: (5401
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suppoI1ing tactics. Therefore. this research focuses on three types of slack resources that
are particularly relevant to firms that are going through an IPO. Like most work on slack,
we use financial slack as an independent variable. We also develop two measures of
slack that are new: innovation slack-the reason most new firms emerge-and mana
gerial slack, which reflects Penrose's (1959) original arguments on spare management
capacity and its value in promoting firm growth. By examining all three types, this work
provides a more complete understanding of the effects of slack resources on young
organizations.
Slack denotes the difference between a firm's current resources and the current
resource demands on the linn (Mishina. Pollock. & Porae, 2004). Slack resources provide
firms with the required flexibility to develop strategic options to pursue opportunities
(Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998). They also can be diverted or redeployed to achieve orga
nizational goals (George. 2005). Slack ha~ been used to explain diverse organizational
phenomena including performance. innovation. goal conflict. effectiveness, and political
behavior, and these resources differ in both type (e.g .. financial or social capital) and form
(c.g.. absorbed or unahsorbed). As already noted, studies of organizational slack typically
have focused on large publicly traded firms. which arc dealing with very different issues
to nascent 11rms. Verv~ little attention has been given in the literature to the effect of
organizational slack on the performance of these younger firms.
In business, we llsually address risk in terms of managerial risk, or income stream
uncertainty tef. Palmer & Wiseman. 1999). but a third conceptualization of risk. which is
implicit in these other definitions. is explained as probability x consequence (Reed.
Lemak. & Hesser, 1997). This latter conceptualization of risk has utility in model building
(Storrucl-Barnes. Reeel. & Jessup, 20 I0). Here. probabi lity and consequence refer to the
probability of an investor losing their investment in an IPO flnn. In larger. established
f1rms. the implicit question that has always shadowed work on slack is whether or not an
agency issue exists as managers try to reduce risk to their employment capital by holding
slack as a cushion against a downturn in performance (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981: Nohria &
Gulati. 1995, 1996). In established f1rms, managers keep their jobs and stockholders keep
most or all of their investment. For new firms. the issue is different. Slack resources reduce
the probability that the firm will fail. which means that for a given level of return, investors
will be willing to pay a premium at the time of the IPO. In new firms, not only do slack
resources increase the upside potential of being able to capitalize on opportunities. they
also reduce downside risk for investors.
This work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we propose that slack
resources represent important information for IPO investors; slack resources act as a
quality signal. It thus provides insight into the value investors place on slack resources.
Second, it provides empirical support for the conceptual framework by drawing on a rich
set of IPO data in the United States during the period of 2001-2009. Third, we extend
organizational slack research by moving away from well-established organizations to
study the effect of slack resources in IPO finns. Finally. this study extends knowledge on
organizational slack by moving beyond the traditional emphasis on financial slack to
include innovational and managerial slack.

-

Theoretical Foundations and Literature Review
Signaling Theory and IPO Firm Research
Investors not only find it challenging (0 evaluate the overall quality of an IPO
in terms of the potential returns that will be generated. there are also difficulties with
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assessing risk, despite [he list of risks that have to be included in the published pro
spectuses, Assessing risk is difficult because these new-[o-the-murket firms may have
few or no revenues, and it may be difficult to accurately value their assets, To overcome
such hurdles, investors seek nontraditional methods for making assessments of IPO
quality, They rely on signals that can indicate the quality of the firm (Cerlo, 2003), Firms
that afC able to signal high quality stand a better chance of raising the necessary capital
through an IPO for commercialization of underlying technology and future growth
(Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs, 1997: Stuart. Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Among other
things. signaling mechanisms that are llsed by firms include the reputations of invest
ment bankers (Carter. Dark, & Singh. 1998b). auditor,; (Beatty. 1989). and VCl1lurc
capitalists (Megginson & Weiss. 1991). The t:1Ct that investment bankers avoid poor
quality IPO Ilrms to protect their reputations is evidence of the credibility of this type of
signal (Certo. 2003). According to market-signaling theory. certain variables or indica
tors send signab to potential investors about the capabiliti(:s and, therefore, the future
value of finns (Akerlof. 1970: Spellce. 1973). Signaling theory is useful in situations
where information asymmetry is high (Spence) because, as Akerlof showed. in instances
where buyers (for IPOs, read investors) cannot determine quality. they are reluctant to
buy. and markets collapse.
The literature on 11'0 signaling is extensive. For example, the board of directors can
act as a signal to potential resource holders about the quality of a young firm (Certo. Daily.
& Dalton, 200 I), especially given that investors value prestigious board structures, thus
reducing the liability of newness and improving IPO firm stock performance (Ccrto.
2003). Pollock. Chell. Jackson, and Hambrick (2010) found that prestigious affiliates
(executives, directors. venture capitalists. ami underwriters) communicatc different
signals of IPO worth. Other signals. for example. can indicate a top management team
(TMT),s ability to manage the firm (Zimmerman, 2(08). Signals to investors also can be
achieved through releasing informatioll on research and development (R&D) expendi
tures. the history of technological performance. or the number of products brought to the
market (Deeds el al.. 1997). Table I provides a summary of key literature Oil signaling
in IPOs.
Ndofor and Levitas (2004. p. 688) define signaling as "the conduct and observable
attributes that alter the beliefs of. or convey information to. other individuals in the
market about unohservable attributes and intentions." Where Ndofor and Levitas were
concerned with both behavior and attributes. we arc concerned only with the latter. We
are concerned with investors' ability to see information on slack resources and interpret
it in terms of potential for future income and amelioration of investment risk. Thus.
we draw on the essential principle of signaling theory: the signal must be observable
(Spence. 1973) and known in advance (Certo. Daily, et al.. 2001: Janney & Folta. 20(H).
Consistent with the logic of Ndofor and Lcvitas. !inns that signal the existence of slack
resources are creating a "separating equilibrium" whereby investors are able to distin
guish between firms with the potential f,)r growth and reduced risk and those that do uo!
have the potential. or which carry higher risk. Given that money for investment in lPOs
is not available in infinite alllounts. and that other firms Illay be doing an 11'0 at the saille
time. it becomes a zero-sum game whereby olle firm is likely to win at another's expense.
Firms that are endowed with slack resources will therefore make a point of signaling it
to investors. whereas those that do not possess the slack will be unable to make that
signal.
Because resource information is included in the prospectus. slack resources arc
known to investors in advance of the actual offering. Pinancial-slack information can
be gathered from a firm's balance sheet. Information on other types of slack, such
11
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Signals Found to Influence IPO Performance
Signal

How

Studies in the literature

For ('"x:ullplc. pro.ldc hnam:ml

r('\utJn:c~

and

cxpcni\e th;l! ..,CT\e a.. HnpNt:mt <:.igllah of new
,\udltor rqlUW!I('1l

Unucrwnlcr rc-pUIJlion

\CnlUrc quality,
Tll\.' ljuahty nf Ilk' auditor II III <,igt1:l1 the high
qU:Jhty of til;: IPO firm
Pr"""tlglOu~ undcrwnkrs \\ ill not a;;"o<:ialc
!henhdn'~ \\ illl 1m. -quality 11mb

PC;l\Y. & Vct~\lYp"~I1~, 1090;
&. Gompcr,>. 20{jJ; Gul.!li & Hlggm:.,
2lYfl,; Lw, 199(1: Mct'T.in,>on & W\'I~\, 1991)
dkatty. 1939, D:.lily. Ccrt\), D3!tOIl, &..
Roengpliya. 20(H: Titm31l & Trueman, 1(86)
(i3nfTY ct aL. 1990; Bently & Ritter, JClS6; Booth

!B;:u--ry,

Mu~c,m:II;1.

Bra~-

8:.. Smith.
('.11-\('( c1

\ !ll'tur) of :.tr,mg cammg" "lgna!" fUltlf(> '>tron)::

ProUlIn'::m . .dlih..illl',n\
v.!lh urgani/;IlJOn~
Lo-ckup pawd

P)){(j~

('arter &

"L F)l)i\h;

\1an:J.~ltr,

D:tllj d

,]L

1990.

20n;j

i.T.:oh. \\\:kh. & WOlllg, jIJ98i

fkrl'c1nllJIKl'
Firm'> "\lIb pf<l!lllfWll alli!J,l!!(>n<, go thrdiJ:?h ilK'
IPO faster and arc \ahh'tl bd!cr
A kngthltf It1ckup perIOd '>Ignah tha! 0\\ ncr.., ',I 11]
h.lh· to he a..,\tKIa(cd v.tlll l/J" linn up 1\1 a
j1Ullll and 111:11 Ihc~ arc taking {in ;1 liqUIdity
1,.'\hL

Fmn

'>IN

Lar?,cl
T?l.1T

linn~

111lghl !J;l\C JC(C\\ 10 nwr..-:

(omp'hilhHl eill ~lgnal

leg!linlJcy 31(mg

lhree dmlCn\IOU": 1.11 ac(¢'>"

f()

;1hllny It! {ullill kcy rob. alld
;lIImcl cmlM,Cf(h'nt !rnm
Pr(,~JlglOu", dir('{Wh

(ou!J

r<:·,Ollr..:c~

((';ifler, f):lfL &. Smgh, 199f:Cl, 19<)Bh; Daily
cl aL. 2ffG; Ibbob0\l, Sllldd,lf, & Ritter. jiJX8j
! Hlggin~ & GuLli!' 2(){}bj

ft''-OUn..T'>. j ~j

(l.j

,lhilll) to

pr("~lJgio\h r;iflner~

!I1(r<::w,;: fion

kgl!imJc) and hCllLl.' [l)\\Cf

In!onn:l!101l

a~}mmctf)

-\ <.iglJ;l[ oj cnnI!J~'lw~' to pnhfh>dl\(' BWt'\("f<.

(CaIn, :::003; L;:'>ler, Ccrt\!, 1),1!i()J1, D:ll!On, (..;
C:m!lcllJ, 20i)6; N..'h()J), 1003; S:J!1uer.

«

Bnivie,20ll'j.)
(c,:rto ('{ .11" 20CH, Om1y et aI, 2003; Dowm',
& Hl'inkcl. 1982; Pllato!dwv & BhllOp. 2002,
h<chef & Pollod" 200·1: McHam & Kr;lU~c,
l!Jb\)1

as managerial and innovational slack, also can be found in the prospectus. Managerial
information can be found in the management section of the prospectus. Innovational
slack information can be found both in the income statement (R&D spending) and in the
business section (patent counls).

Organization Slack
Financial Slack Researchers have used financial slack in a number of different forms as
a predictor of innovation (Nohria & Gulati. 1996), performance (Bromiley. 1991; Tan &
Peng, 2003), and the firm' s ability to experiment (Wiseman & BromiIey, 1996). Financial
slack refers to the level of assets available to an organization (e.g .. cash on hand) (Kraatz
& Zajac, 2001) tilat can easily be deployed to varied uses (Mishina et aI., 2004). Financial
slack is the least absorbed form of slack, especially given that it is completely divisible
for the allocation of multiple activities (Greve, 2003). The existence of liquid financial
resources in a firm indicates that the fjrm has resources in excess of what is required
to meet current obligations and support current sales levels (Mishina et aLl. Financial
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resources can be generated internally or externally. Internal resources are composed
mainly of the profits from a firm's present investments. Those raised externally are
acquired through capital markets or financial institutions and can be used for future
investment. These financial resourccs can be used to purchase equipment. employ scien
tists. build new laboratories. invest in new buildings. hire sales people. invest in R&D, and
improve marketing. Financial resources thus offer [0 finns a high level of transferability
to profit-yielding activities (Amit & Schoemaker. 1993). Although financial resources are
not rare or unique. they are essential and do offer a competitive advantage to firms that
possess them (Latham & Braun. 2008). Their existence in new firms can lead to superior
financial performance and. thus, better IPO valuations.
Some scholars have argued that slack may be advantageous only up to a ce11ain
point (Bourgeois, 1981: Nohria & Gulati, 1995, 1996; Tan & Pcng, 2003) because
Bourgeois's original thinking on the topic linked organizational inefficiency to slack. He
argued that inefficiency is a natural outcome of high levels of slack within an organi
zation. This may be true in weil-established. publicly traded Ilrms. We argue that IPO
finns do not have the luxury of being seell as inefficiellt. given the high scrutiny they
face when going public. However. firm valuation may depend 011 whether a firm will
have the resources necessary to successfully navigate the IPO process. In this case.
slack would ease capital restrictions and improve the strategic choices of managers for
investments with positive performance implications (George, 20(5). Also, it allows flex
ibility and experimentation. which can have positive performance effects (George).
Bourgeois fllliher suggested that slack gives decision makers the freedom to make deci
siclIIs with little information. and that. when necessary, it may give an organization the
time needed 10 collect additional information. In view of these arguments. we propose
that higher levels of financial slack are positively related to firm valuation at IPO. The
higher the level of linancial slack. the stronger and more apparent is the quality signal
to investors.
Using precedent (e.g .. Mishina et al.. 2004; Voss, Sirdeshl11ukh, & Voss, 2(08). ami
building on the view that slack resources should be considered as excess resources rather
than just total resources (Moses. 1992). we explore the effects of two different types of
financial slack (cash reserves and working capital). Cash reserves represent the level of
available cash (cash on hand) to an organization (Kraatz & Zajac. 20(1). For investors.
slack resources in the form of cash. which is the nearest of financial resources and the
most fungible, sends a strong signal. If the tirm has sales, then it signals upside potential
in the form of positive cash flow and an ability to generate more cash. In terms of the
dowllside. regardless of whether or not the linn has sales. it signals protection against
failure and bankruptcy. The more cash a firm has, then the more positive the signal.
Working capital is different. It is the difference between current assets and current
liabilities. and it captures the use of current resources relative to activity (Bourgeois &
Singh, 1983). II portrays information OJ] the assets required to maintain day-to-day
operations. and includes things like inventory needed for operations and excess of
accollnts receivable over accounts payable. again. relative to the level of activity (Moses).
Working capital is a resource that is neither a near resource (easily turned into cash),
particularly in young finns without the leverage to collect bills or with invcntory of a new
or unproven technology. nor is it particularly fungible. That means that the greater the
amount of working capital required to maintain day-tcH!ay operations, the greater the risk
for investors. Firms that can operate with less working capital should be able to attract an
investment premium over those that require more working capital.
Details Oil approaches lIsed to measure cash reserves and working capital are
described in the Method, section. [n the interim. it can he stated that:
1127

Hypothesis la: There is a positive linear relationship between cash reserves and IPO
valuation.
Hypothesis Ib: There is a negative linear relationship between working capital and
IPO valuation.

Innovational Slack. Our interest lies specifically with the slack useful for generating
innovations. which will be called in this paper "innovational slack." Innovational slack
refers to the stock of resources available to an organization such as underused R&D
facilities. specialized development staff. and time for development activities. Managers
call allocate a certain amount of time for product developers to work on their own
projects and loosen performance standards for new projects (Jelinek & Schoonhoven.
1990). Overall. then. innovational slack can be viewed as a refinement to existing
organizational-slack theory. In this work. we view innovational slack as excess ullused
intellectual property and above-industry-average R&D spending. We suggest that
firms may have two different types of innovational slack: inputs into the innovation
process (e.g .. R&D) and outputs (e.g .. patents). Both can be lIsed to create more inno
vations through the application of new knowledge or by combining them with other
knowledge.
Proponents of slack argue that organizational slack plays a vital role in allowing
innovation (Nohria & Gulati. 1995). Slack permits firms to more safely experiment with
new strategies and innovative projects that lllost probably would not be approved in a more
resource-constrained environment (Cyert & March, 196311992). Other researchers
counter this argument, suggesting that slack diminishes incentives to innovate ancl pro
motes undisciplined investment in R&D activities that rarely yield economic benefits
(Leibenstein, 1969). To reconcile these differences. Nohria ancl Gulati (1995. 1996)
hypothesized and demonstrated that the actual relationship between slack and innovation
is curvilinear (an inverse U-shape). Pcr that inverted-U argument on slack. it can be argued
that too much slack before the IPO implies that such firms will face diminishing disci
pline. As slack increases, the discipline that is exercised in the selection, ongoing support.
and termination of projects becomes lax (Jensen, 1993: Leibenstein: Nohria & Gulati.
1996). For example. over time, and with increasing slack, risky projects with negative net
present value may be funded simply because the resources exist to indulge agents for
whom these are pet projects (Nohria & Gulati). Escalation of commitment also becomes
an issue given that excess levels of slack make it difficult to terminatc someone' s pet
project (Staw, Sandelands. & Dutton, 1981). Therefore, it can be argued that innovational
slack fosters an X-inefficient (Leibenstein. 19(6) atmosphere around resource allocation
that increases both the risk that poor projects will be continued even in the face of negative
information and that projects will he abandoned simply because someone ran out of
energy. became bored. or ran into a tough problem (Nohria & Gulati. 1996). Based OIl
these arguments we propose that innovational slack would have a positive effect on IPO
valuations up to a certain point. but, after that point. slack can indicate future inefficiency
ancI will have a negative effect.
The relative amount of R&D spending has heen used as an indicator of innovative
activity (Scherer, 1980), and a number of studies have considered the relationship between
R&D spending, productivity returns. and linn performance (Comanor, 1965: Grabowski
& Vernon, 1990: Graves & Langowitz. 1993). As the majority of the work in this area
notes, there are strong industry norms associated with R&D spending. We therefore
hypothesize that. relative to the industry. R&D spending will he associated with gains in
[PO value but. after a certain point, investors will interpret the spending as indicative of
inefficiency. and the effect will be negative.
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Patents also are widely used as indicators of innovation activity and essential tech
nology positions (Deeds et aI., 1997, p. 37), and arc widely accepted measures used by
policy makers. analysts (Van del' Eerden & Saelens, 1991), and researchers (Deeds et al.).
Patents provide inventors with protection in the form of a finite-life monopoly for their
intellectual property. Governments are willing to issue patents to inventors in return for the
greater good to society or economic progress. but issuing patents is an effective way to
remove barriers to informatioll asymmetry. As Long (2002) indicated. a downside to
providing the information in a patent means that competitors may be able to quickly
circumvent critical aspects of an invention and effectively appropriate some of the pat
entee's rents. The solution to that problem is to patent and protect information for core
markets and related technologies by creating impenetrable patent fences, which allow the
patent holder to exploit a technology and appropriate relums by blocking existing and new
competitors (Reitzig. 2004). The creation of fences involves what is referred to as patent
rafting or bulking, which simply means that a large number of patents are created around
the core technology and related technologies. The process can be expensive. Firms not
only have to apply for the patents but also have (0 maintain the patents through renewal,
up to three limes during the life of the patent in the United States. with increasing fees
for eacb renewal (Malewicki & Sivukumar, 2004 J. After the patents have been issued.
they then have to be defended against infringement (Long). As explained by Grady,
Alexander, Martin, and Merges (1992),
. to make defense worthwhile, the benefits of
protecting the technology have to be significant. In addition to the costs of application and
renewal, there are also the costs of time (patent-infringement monitoring). legal costs. and
emotional and time costs of defense. As Somaya (2003, p. 24) explained in his research
on patent litigation in the computers and research-medicine industries. defense can be
expensive, not only in terms of direct legal costs but also because it absorbs "the time
of key managers. lawyers. engineers, and scientists in the company." As the number of
patents held inereases. so too do defense costs. Like research and development (R&D)
spending, we predict that the relationship between patenting and IPO value will be an
inverted-U shape with firms preferring mid levels of patent slack.

-

Hypothesis 2a: There i, an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D slack aud
IPO valuation, with the best 1PO valuations occurring at an intermediate level of R&D
slack.
Hypothesis 2b: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between patent slack and
[PO valuation, with (he best 11'0 valuations occurring at intermediate levels of patent
slack.
Mallagerial Slack. After IPO. the top management team must learn to deal with reduced
flexibility in managerial discretion. increased oversight from the lirm's board of directors
and blockholders, greater demands from investors for short-term performance, and less
tolerance of negative press and performance volatility (PriceWaterhotlse, 1995). The TMT
must deal with significant cultural changes, as well as change resulting from its employ
ees' neVi-found wealth as options are exercised anti stock is sold, which can lead to some
employees leaving the company and some others become less willing to make the
personal sacrifices that were required to get the firm to the IPO stage (Fischer & Pollock,
2004). All of this means that executives are managing the upheaval caused by the IPO
while trying to manage growth and plan for the future. Penrose (1959) recognized the
importance of managerial slack as an essential factor in linn growth. She observed that
finns are able to grow and develop only when excess "managerial services" are released
to allow managers to plan and direct growth. She also pointed out that newer IlnllS are
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faced with numerous difficulties and that focusing on growth while managing those
difficulties is extremely challenging (Penrose). The notion of having above-average mana
gerial resources and experience at the time of the IPO is our conceptualization of
managerial slack. That means not only having a sufficient nnmber of managers but
also having managers with industry experience. Managers' experience with firm-level
resources produces firm-specific knowledge about the productive opportunities available
to the linn (Penrose). Penrose further observed that this experience-based knowledge
is proprietary because it cannot rapidly be transferred to new managers. nor can it be
purchased in the market. She also emphasized that managers cannot function well as a
team without firm-specific. shared experience in the TMT. which leads to the creation of
wcit knOWledge. In short. managerial expertise is a resource that is valuable. rare. and
difficultlo imitate.
Along with Penrose (1959). other researchers have argued that managers playa vital
role in choosing a firm' s direction. the markets it will participate in. and the blend of
resources it will deploy and nurture (Castanias & Helfat. 199]; Kor & Mahoney. 2000;
Mahoney & Pandian. 1992). An important insight frol11 the resource-based view shows
that to generate superior returns. a fim] must not only possess unique resources but also
effectively and innovatively manage such resources (Mahoney. 1995). In pm1icular. lhe
bundle of managerial experiences can reflect the TMT's skills. knowledge. and compe
tencies (Carpenter. Sanders. & Gregersen. 2001; Harris & Helfat. 1997). To assess mana
geJial competence at the upper ranks. an examination of the bundle of experiences in the
TMT is essential. especially because professional management experience molds the
knowledge. confidence. and imagination of mangers (Penrose: Van de Ven. Hudson. &
Schroeder. 1984).
Clearly. managers as a resource are crucial for survival and success. On the one the
hand. with too few managers. the probability of failure increases. On the other hand. too
many managers also create problems. Too many managers not only raises costs in terms
of managerial salaries. benefits. and perquisites. but it will also likely lead to a prolifera
tion of organizational policies. procedures. and red tape as managers justify their existence
and salaries. Again. in Leibenstein's (1966. 19(9) terms. firms with too many managers
suffer from X-inefficiency. Thus. in terms of managerial slack. we postulate that Nohria
and Gulati's (1995. 1996) curvilinear view of slack will hold. We also postulate that it
applies to our second measure of slack: managers' industry experience. Experience slack
is aimed at capturing the managerial knowledge of the opportunities. threats. competition.
and technologies (Kor. 2003) of an industry that also is important for survival and success.
Several studies have shown that a significant amount of comlllonality characterizes the
perceptions of managers operating within the same industry. In particular. strategic and
environmental information drawn from intra-industry sources bear a marked similarity to
lOp managers' own knowledge and perceptions of the environment and opportunities
within it. Spender (1989). labeling these common views "shared recipes." suggested that
they emerge as a function of managers' similar experiences amassed through industry
tenure. Earlier. Hambrick (1982) had noted a comparable homogeneity in views fostered
by top managers' reliance on common sources of industry informatioll. Industry-specillc
experience helps top managers intensify their knowledge of competitive conditions and
specific technologies in the industry. However. as that knowledge increases. it can change
from being a valuable resource to being a core rigidity as managers fall prey to the
insidious nature of dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis. 1986). Thus. too little industry
knowledge can be a bad thing. as can too much.
Traditionally. the TMT has been defined as lop-level executives such as the chief
executive officer (CEO). chief operating officer. business unit heads. and vice presidents
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(Carpenter et aI., 2001; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), Specifically in the IPO literature,
researchers have considered all inside executives listed in the prospectlls as kcy manage
ment personnel (e.g., Kor. 2003). This work follows that convention when assessing
managerial slack.
Hypothesis 3a: There is an inverted U-shapcd relationship between the number of
insiders' slack and the IPO value. with the best IPO valuations occurring at an inter
mediate level of number of insiders' slack.
H)'pothesis 3b: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between insiders' industry
experience slack and IPO value. with the best IPO valuations occurring at an inter
mediate level of industry experience slack.

Methods
Sample
To test the hypotheses. we developed a sample fnlm all U.S. high-tech flrms that had
undertaken an IPO between 200 I and 2009. High-tech firms were selected to allow us
to more easily test the hypothesis on innovational slack. Based OIl Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes. flrms were identified as operating in high-technology sectors
(Daily. Certo, & Daltoll, 2005). High-technology lirms are dell ned as those in SIC codes
28 (biotechnology and drugs). 35 (computer and related). 38 (medical equipment). 73
(software). 36 (electronics and communication), and 48 (telephone equipment and com
munications services) (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Loughran & Ritter. 2004). Consistent
with prior research in the fleld, holding companies, financial institutions, and real estate
investment trusts were excluded from the sample (e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 2004). The data
were collected from the prospectuses found on the Securities and Exchange Commission
Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval system for IPOs. The final sample included 299
firms.

Measures
Dependent Variable, IPO value. which is also known as IPO proceeds raised. represents
the capital raised and transferred to the linn and its owners at IPO. It is measured as the
total value of the capital raised (the offer price x the number of shares sold in the
offering) minus the underwriters' fees as presented on the cover page of the I1rm' s
prospectus (Deeds et al.. 1997; Finkle. J998: Gulati & i-Jiggins. 2003: Zimmerman.
2008). The importance of a venture being able to issue an [PO is extremely important
because it captures the amouIlt of capital that an IPO flrm can truly lise (Deeds et al.).
Therefore. the point at which these ventures decide to undergo an IPO represents a rare
opportunity to measure their performance up to that point (DeCarolis & Deeds. 1999).
Ccrto. Holcomb. and Holmes (2009) have further suggested that this measure is both
a measure of Ilrm IPO performance (Gulati & Higgins: Zimmerman) and a measure
of how the market values a company at the time of the initial offering (Deeds. Mang. &
Frandsen. 2004: Finkle).

Indepelldent Variables. There is considerable variety in industry context in the sample,
and it is possible that slack may differ across industries (George. 20(5). For instance.
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Miller. Lant. Milliken. and Korn (1996) illustrated that slack correlates differently with
perfonnance in the furniture versus software industries. And because slack is operation
ally defined as excess absolute levels of resources (Nohria & Gulati. 1996). we chose to
calculate slack as the deviation from the mean of each of the six industries in the sample
(e.g.. George). [n IPO research. carc is taken to ensure that sample firms are compared
with representative sets. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and Brau. Brown, and
Osteryoung (2004) compared their samples of IPO firms with industry "peers." while
Arend (2003) did a dyadic comparison of IPOs with other within-industry IPOs, and
MacGregor. Slovic. Dreman. and Berry (2000) split their sample around intra-industry
IPO means. Given that we include all IPO firms within our selected industries. we have
calculated slack as the deviation from the within-industry. IPO-firm mean.
We also need to note that financial ratios that arc widely used in the literature may
differ from one industry to another. Ratios that are the norm in one industry could be
extraordinarily high or low in another industry, and thus slack measures may not gener
alize across industries (Miller & Leihlein. 1996). Lev ( 1969) argued that average industry
financial ratios offer reasonable proxies for target levels. Therefore, we measured all slack
resources as the difference of a firm's own measures (e.g .. accounting ratios) and its
industry average. We only utilized firms in our sample to create the industry averages
given the uniqueness of IPOs. We believe that the closest comparable group with any IPO
firm would be similar finns that are in the saIlle industry that also are in the process of
going public.
Cash reser!'es represent the level of available cash (cash on hand) to an organization
(Kraatz & Zajac. 200 I). These are available for deployment for virtually any purpose. This
measure of financial slack is consistent with those adopted in other studies (e.g .. George,
2005: Miller & Leiblein. 1996; Voss et aI., 2(08). Firm cash slack was calculated w;ing the
following:
Cash slack

= (firm cash reserves) -

(average industry cash reserves)

As already noted. lI'orking ('{[pital was chosen because it has been identified by
scholars as an appropriate and useful operationalization of !1nancial slack. given that it
considers the (appropriate) level of working capital to meet current needs (Mishina et a!.,
2004; Moses. 1992). Working capital is calculated by taking the difference between a
firm'.s current assets (e.g .. cash and ca,h equivalents, accounts receivable, inventory. and
marketable securities) and a firm's current liabilities (e.g .. accounts payable and accrued
expenses) (Brealey & Myers, 1996). The amount that is left after subtracting current
liabilities from current assets is a measure of short-term financial resource utilization
(Bromiley, 1991; March & Shapira, 1987). We measured it as follows:
Working capital slack = (finn working capital) - (average industry working capital).
These measures are also similar to the conceptualization advanced by Singh (1986) in
regard to the two-component concept of slack where he measured absorbed and unah
sorbed slack using cash and working capital. There are. of COHrse. several measures or
tlnancial slack such as the three-componenL-based concept developed by Bourgeois and
Singh (1983) where slack was measured using available slack (which might be equated to,
say. cash). potential slack (a finn's equity-to-debt ratio). and recoverable (or absorbed)
slack (which was measured using selling, general and administrative expenses divided
by flrm sales) (Bromiley, 1991). We chose not to calculate slack with three components
(e.g .. Bromiley) given the diff]culty in reliably using ratios slich as equity to debt for firms
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that are going through an IPO. The debt to equity calculation does not work because. of
course. the equity is arriving via the dependent variable. JPO value. Also. most of these
young high-tech firms possibly will have little or no equity while having a lot of debt.
Additionally. the equity S!llIcture might not really be well-known at the point of IPO.
Both R&D spending (input flows to the innovation process) and patents (stocks of
output of research) are indicators of firm innovation. Traditionally. the relative amount
of R&D spending has been used as an indicator of innovative activity (Scherer. 1980). All
else being equal. if Ilnns spend more on R&D than the industry average. there is a higher
probability of them having slack intellectual property than if they spent less than the
induslry average. This variable is based on the R&D-intensity variable that typically has
been calculated as the level of investments divided by the firm's sales. assets. or number
of employees (e.g., Deeds, DeCarolis. & Coombs. 1998; Eltlic, 1998). In this study. R&D
investments are standardized by total assets because many IPO firms do not have sales
because they are still ill the carly years of product developmcnt(Deeds et al.; Kor. 20(6). We
used the last audited year of R&D spending as provided in the prospect liS of the IPO firm.
R&D investment slack = (firm R&D/firm assets) - (average industry R&D/
average industry assets).
The second innovational-slack measure is palelll illlensity slack. Patents arc eonsid
ered indicators of vital technology positions and inllovative activity (Ashton & Sen. 1988).
According to Deeds et al. (1998). a firm's patent stock is an indication of the size of a
linn's stoek of intellectual property. and thus research productivity. Patent intensity slack
was measured using the following equation;
Patent inten,dty slack", (number of linn patents! firm assets)
(average industry patents/average industry assets).
A1allageria/ slack was defined earlier in the sludy as those excess managerial skills and
I!xperiences that hdp the firlll to grow and. also as previously noted. in the JPO literalllrc.
researchers have considered all inside exeeutives Iisted in the prospectus as key manage
ment personnel (e.g .. Kor. 2(03). Therefore, this work also lIses the number of all insiders:
Insider slack", (number of firm TMTjfirm assets)
(average industry TMT/avcrage industry assets).
To caplllre a different dimension of managerial slack. we measured experience
slack-the industry experience of the TMT. Based on Kor (2003). we measured this
variable as the average number of managerial positions held in the same industry by
managers in the firm compared with the average industry TMT positions held. This
measure captures the breadth of industry-specifIc experience possessed by the managers
(Kor). and similar to the first measure. it assumes that firms with more managers with
industry experience will have more experience slack to draw upon. Also. because the size
of TMTs differ from one company to the other, taking the Ilumber of positions held
relative to the average number of the TMT will control for the size of 1he flrl11. Thus:
Experience slack
'" (average firm TMT positions/lotal number of linn insiders)
(average industry TMT positions/average number of indust!'y insiders).
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Control Variables
Per the precedent established in other IPO studies, we controlled for firm age
(e.g., Beatty, 1989; Beatty & Zajac. 1994; Finkle, J998). which we measured as years
from founding (e.g., Zimmerman, 2008). It was employed as a control variable in this
work because older firms, both prior to and following the IPO, have been found to
financially outperform younger firms (Ceno. Covin. Daily, & Dalton. 2001; Ritter.
1998). Also. firms with longer track records are known to have a greater chance of
survival (e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 20(4). The reputation of the Ululenvriler can impact
investors' perceptions of IPO firm quality (Beatty & Ritter; Carter et al.. 1998b; Carter
& Manaster, 1990). We coded this variable from Jay Ritter's personal website at the
University of Florida (where all underwriter reputation rankings are available) and it is
based on the methodology employed by Carter and Manaster and Carter, Dark, and
Singh. We also controlled for founder efrects because founders may affect the survival
and performance of new ventures (Cerlo, Covin. et aI.. 2001; Nelson. 20(3). We llsed a
dummy variable to opermiollalize founder on the board (I = founder, 0 = nonfoullder)
(e.g.. Arthurs et al.. 20(9). Number of risk factors are included because higher risk
may increase underpricing and could influence performance. Certo, Covin. et al. (200 [.
p. 650) write that "risk factors associated with a finn can affect both perfommnce
expectations and realized performance." Therefore. a 11rm's risk position was operation
alized as the number of risk factors as reported in the prospeclUs (Beatty & Zajac;
Welbourne & Andrews. 1996).
Equity raised or the percentage of equity offered in the IPO was measured as the ratio
of total shares offered to total shares outstanding (l\1udambi & Zimmerman. 2005). It is
important to control for this variable since the amount of capital raised at IPO might be a
function of the percentage of equity the company t10ats at IPO (Zimmerman. 2(08). Serial
.!iJ/lilder counted the number of other finns founded by TMT members as listed in the
prospectus. IPO firms that had one or more top managers with experience in founding
other companies were coded "I," while firms without such experience were coded "0:'
Typically. venture capitalists have a very positive outlook toward previolls experience in
founding other finllS (Wright. Robbie. & Ennew. 1997).
A high volume of IPO activity usually characterizes hot markets (Ibbotson & Jaffe.
1975). During such a period. the number of firms that undergo an IPO and the average
value of the [POs brought to market is considerably higher than during a normal period
(DeCarolis & Deeds. J 999; Ritter, 1989). Our data showed that 2004, 2005, 2006. and
2007 all had the characteristics of a hot market. IPOs during the hot market years were
coded "I." while all others were coded "0."
Generated slack generally denotes available resources for developing strategy options
for future l1exibility and was measured as sales per employee (Chakravarthy. 1986). More
specifically, this ratio refers to the ability to attain surplus revenue from employees. and
therefore the higher the ratio, the higher the resources available for future flexibility
(Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998). fm'ested slack was measured using R&D by sales ratio
(Chakravarthy) and generally represents deployed resources, which could reduce the
opportunity to develop strategy options for future flexibility. We controlled for both of
these slack measures given that some previous research has shown that excellent firms are
better at managing their slack resources (Chakravarthv) and that some slack studies found
a positive relationship between slack and performance (e.g .. Bromiley. J991; Miller &
Leiblein. 1996).
We controlled for prior sales. If a J1rm has sales, then investors consider a firm's
revenue track record before the IPO (Zimmerman, 2(08). Prior sales were measured using
the towl revenue as reported in the prospectus in each firm's income statement. This
~
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measure could also impact the amount of slack a firm has for a particular year given that
the budgeting process will depend. in pan. on prior sales. We also controlled for the
possible effects of venture-capital backing (Ve-backing) (e.g.• Certo. Daily. et al.. 2001:
Megginson & Weiss. 1991). This variable has shown to influence the ability of an IPO
finn to raise capital (Brav & Gompers. 2003: Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Megginson &
Weiss). increase chances of survival (Khurshed, 2000). and influence the amount of slack
resources a tinn has (Macmillan. Kulow. & Khoylian. 1989). Firms backed by venture
capitalists were calculated as a dichotomous measure coded I for VC-backing. 0 if not.
Retum Oil (Isseis (ROM was measured in the year prior to IPO (Miehaely & Shaw. 1994).
We controlled for ROA given that profitability is an "obvious determinant" of finns' slack
resources (Chakravarthy. 1986). We controlled for jirm si:e given that prior research has
shown that larger IPO firms tend to outperform smaller ones in terms of stock appreciation
(e.g.. Megginson & Weiss: Mikkelsoll. Partch. &. Shah. 1997). We used log of empJoyees
to control for size (e.g .. Deeds et al.. 1997). Finally, we <.:O!l!rolled for pril'llfe jii/ill/cillg
that IPO firms had received before going public to control for previous success in securing
financial capital (c.g .. Gulati & Higgins: Stuart &. Sorenson. 2003).'

Results
We used partial hierarchical Illultiple regression to examine the hypotheses. Table 2
presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all variables. Overall, the
correlations are low to intermediate. Patent slack is positively cOiTelated with R&D
slack. a result that is not surprising because any firm that invests heavily in research
would also want to protect any innovations that might be found during the process. Thus.
it is logical that as the commitment to R&D increases. so would the number of patents
owned by the finn. The number-of-managers slack is negatively correlated with firm size
in our dataset and positively correlated to cash slack, suggesting that a control for firm
size is important for measuring the effect of managerial slack and tlnancial slack. Patent
and R&D slack also were positively correlated to managerial slack. However. because
the variance inflation factors (VIF) for these terms are below 3.4. which is well below
the VIF of I() that Kenlledy advocates is indicative of "harmful collinearity" (Kennedy,
1992. p. 183). it is unlikely that this correlatioll will confound the results of any statis
tical tests.' We examined the VIF for all models: nOlle were close to the coml11only
accepted threshold of 10 (Cryer & Miller. 1991: Neter. Wasserman. & Kutner, 1985).
The VIF values ruled out the possibility that multicollinearity and the instability of band
beta were a serious problem.
Table 3 displays the results for the regressions. The base model had five significant
results: serial founder, prior sales. VC backing. firm size. and private financing. Prior
sales. finn size. and private financing all had a positive relationship with IPO value. while
serial founder and VC backing had a negative one. Model 2 shows that the additional
variables contribute significantly to our understanding of the amount of capital raised
through 11'0 beyond the control variables (change in R' '" 0.335). Cash reserves was
positively and significantly related to the size of the IPO valuation while working capital
was negatively and significalllly related (0 IPO valuation. thus providing strong support
for hypotheses I a and lb.

1. \Ve wb.h to thank the anonymous reviewers for this ~ugge\tion, and for other valuabl:2' in~ights,
2. The VIF is cmnpllled '" II( I - (2).
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Table 3
Results of Partial Hierarchical Regression Analysis on IPO Value
Dependent variable: IPO value
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Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted a nonlinear !inverted U-shaped and U-shapcd, res
pectively) relationship between innovational slack and IPQ value, The coefficient for the
R&D-slack squared term is negative and significant, providing support for hypothesis 2a,
and the coefficient for the patent-slack squared term interestingly is positive and signifi
cant, which is opposite to what we expected. The linear terms for both innovational
slack variables were significanl. Hypothesis 3a and 3b predicted all invcJ1ed U-shaped
relationship between managerial slack and IPQ value. The results show that contrary to
OUl' expectations, the coefficient for insider slack squared term is positive and significant.
The squared term coefficient of industry-expericncc slack was negative but not significant.
The number of insiders slack linear term was negative and significant while the linear term
for experience slack was not significant.
Further, we performed additional analyses to evaluate whether the results indicate
robust relationships in the data. First, we reran the same regression equations used to test
the hypotheses with 25'10 of the sample randomly deleted from the data set. The results
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were identical to the ones presented in our model utilizing 100% of the data except for
hypothesis 2 that lost some significance (from p < 0.001 to p < 0,0]). Second, 50% of the
sample were randomly deleted from our data set. This time, the model retained support for
all hypotheses except hypothesis 2 that lost all support. Overall then, it is reasonable to
suggest that our findings seem robust and stable. Further, our results show that they are not
spurious but instead they reveal a distinct structure within the data that is supportive of our
hypotheses.

Discussion
We found financial slack, specifically cash reserves, to be positively and significantly
related to the capital raised through an IPO. The results suggest that financial slack may
provide a signal to investors about the quality of the finn and its future performance
potential. A strong financial position supports future growth because. as Penrose (1959)
explained. a firm's future strategies are mainly determined by its current portfolio of
resources. particularly by its financial resources. Additionally, firms with financial slack
can be sending a signal about their ability to respond to shifting environmental demands
(Cheng & Kesner, 1997). Bromiley (1991) reasoned that financial slack provides firms
with the ability to smooth over short-term disturbances in the environment and, thus, build
and maintain competitive advantage. These jindings arc also interesting given the com
monly held view that financial slack could imply the existence of excess resources that are
not being used for productive purposes (Mishina et al.. 2004) and that it could lead to
inefticiency and nonoptirnizing behavior (Bourgeois, 198 I; Simon. 1957). However. we
sec it as a matter of context, where potential investors seem to perceive financial slack as
a positive-given the high demands of undertaking an IPO-not a negative. Therefore, ill
the case of high-tech firms that arc planning to undertake an IPO, a solid financial position
seems extremely important to reduce the unccnainty surrounding the firm in the eyes
of investors.
On the other ham!. as predicted. working capital slack was negatively related to IPO
value. This result reveals that investors disapprove of tlrms with high levels of working
capital slack. Such a signal can indicate that these young, untested firms have too many
accounts receivables. carry a lot of inventory and, therefore, are inefficient and/oI' risky.
Not being able to collect on receivables could, arguably, be expected from many of these
young tlrrns. Small or new finns are seen as easy targets for tardy payers. Many of these
high-tech industries can be characterized as being difficult to pioneer in. thus making it
1110re difficult to sell the product once it is developed, and being high-tech. product
complexity may require large numbers of expensive parts, thus increasing inventory costs
and risk. Additionally. medical equipment or biotech industries are both industries that
may have very high minimum-efficient scale, therefore making it difficult for these young
companies that are trying to introduce new products into such an industry. Regardless of
all these difficulties. slack in working capital denotes inefficiency and an increased risk
of failure.
Innovational slack was found to be significantly related to 11'0 value. R&D slack was
found to have a negative coeftkient tinvcrted-U shaped), while, contrary to expectations,
patent slack was found to have a positive coefficient relationship with 11'0 value
(U-shaped). The finding for R&D slack is interesting insofar as it suggests that. up to a
certain point, investors perceive R&D slack positively. For high-tech firms that want to
have an IPQ, it seems safe to argue that above-average industry investments are expected.
Investors want to see these firms invesling more than their peers, which might signal high
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levels of commitment to innovation. Firms that arc not committed, or might have CEOs
that are not committed, will be extremely reluctant to have slack in R&D at that stage.
Even though R&D expenditures have been linked to an increase in market value (Chauvin
& Hirschey. 1993; Doukas & Switzer, 1992). it appears that there is an optimal amount.
Large R&D investments in IPO firms might signal high risk. For more established
companies, above-industry-average investments in R&D might be expected. but in the
case of !PO firms-given the uncertainty surrounding R&D investments and the useful
ness of the outcomes-such investments may be a red flag and indicate that innovations
are still 1:11' from being ready for cOlllmercialization. In the case of patent slack. we found
that investors prefer new firms to have either low amounts or high amounts of patent slack.
retlccting preference for either lIsing trade secrets or building patent fences. Thus. the key
selling points for IPO firms is their innovation and their management. and innovation is
best protected through trade secrets or by embracing the costs of patent defense.
We found that managerial slack is signillcantly related to IPO valuations. However.
contrary to our prediction, the number of managers slack squared terlll was positively and
significantly associated (V-shaped) with raising funds through an IPO. It appears that
investors either do not like slack (a lean TMT is better) or they like a large team with spare
capacity. What is surprising, but perhaps should not be given Penrose's (1959) arguments,
is the tinal part of that curvc. where investors value firms with high levels of managerial
slack. We argued that the costs associated with having that many managers would affect
an organization negatively. Investors though seem to feel that high levels of managerial
slack might be an indication of managerial commitment to growth where these firms are
accumulating the resources needed for such plans. Investors seem to be cautious of firms
that have moderate levels of managerial slack and the potential for inefficiency. Finns
that fall in the middle here might signal a lack of purpose since such moderate levels of
managerial slack might not be sufficient for undertaking lame growth initiatives, such as
acquiring another firm (Brau & Fawcett. 2(06). Previous research shows that issuing linns
try to enhance their image and attract investor attention by managing earnings before an
IPO (Tcoh et aI., 19(8). and typically startup firms are known to add managers just before
IPO, in the hopes of raising additional funds and, perhaps. to ease investors' concerns
(Zimmerman. 2(08).
Experience slack was 11m significant. Onc possible conclusion here could be that
investors do not perceive excess managerial experience of TMT members at the time of
the IPO as important as we theorized they would. Because industry-speeifk managerial
experience can be obtained in the labor market and deployed in tlrms in the same industry.
its value added may be low. and investors may view a certain level of experience as
sufficient to undertake any challenge they face. Another possible conclusion might have
had to do with the way we measured expeIience slack. This we discuss further in the
limitations and future directions section.
~

~

~.

~

Implications
The study makes a !lumber of contributions to the literature. It develops a causal logic
for the impact of differcm forms of slack resources on IPO firm success. A.lso. we have
introduced the concepts of innovational and managerial slack that capture an aspect of
slack resources that has not been examined before, thereby extending our know!edge
of organizational slack by moving beyond the traditional emphasis on financial slack.
By examining all three (financial. innovation, and managerial), this work provides a
more complete understanding of the effects of slack resources. George (2005) called
for research to study slack in different contexts to help classify behavioral differences
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between these firms. He believed that this would lead to a refinement of the logic of the
slack-performance relationship. By focusing on IPO firms. this research helps to address
this call. We argue, and our results appear to indicate, that resources can act as signals of
quality, thus extending signaling theory in the IPO literature.
Previous IPO-signaling research focused primarily on the extemal associations
of a finn (e.g., underwriter reputation or VC backing) or fi11l1-specific characteristics
(e.g., firm size or TMT composition). Megginson and Weiss ( 1991 ) found that because VC
backing provides financial resources and expertise to a firm, it signals quality to investors.
Financial and innovational slack also provide valuable signals. Higgins and Gulati (1006)
showed that TMT composition can signal legitimacy in tenns of the ability of the TMT to
fulfill critical roles, access resources. and attract endorsements from prestigious partners.
As this work shows, also having the right numbers of managers also provides a signal for
investors. Moderate levels. however. seem to send a negative signal to investors. possibly
suggesting inefficiency or even window dressing. And high levels of slack seem to be
perceived by investors as a sign that these firms have large growth aspirations possibly
through acquisitions.

Limitations and Future Directions
Because this study included a range of firms from different industries, the results
can reasonably be generalized to different time peIiods and other industries. But there
is the possibility that the unique characteristics of high-tech firms influenced the results.
A focus on less technology-intensive IPO firms, or firms in more stable industries.
might reveal additional insights into the way organizational slack influences IPO valu
ations. Also, this study used secondary data: we relied on observable indicators. such
as the number of managerial positions, to measure managerial-slack constructs that
involve tacit, experiential knowledge. An in-depth study into the process mechanisms
could explain the links between managerial slack and IPO value, and alternative
methodologies, such as surveys, experiments, and simulations, may provide additional
insights.
For future research, other forms of financial. innovational. and managerial slack
deserve to be examined. For example. tapping into managerial experience through the
number of positions is a logical approach, with precedent (e.g., Kor. 2(03). Neverthe
less, the way we measured this variable might have affected the results. Researchers still
find numerous problems with identifying and quantifying specialized knowledge. For
instance. it often only becomes obvious which knowledge was important for success
long after the firm was established and has gone public. For example, with Apple, it
appears that it was Steve Jobs's understanding of the humanization of technology that
was important, rather thun any specific technical knowledge. Also, given that we are
dealing with slack resonrces. that means that we have to be able to quantify the knowl
edge either in absolute terms or relative to others in the field. Making that assessment
requires being an expert in, or having access to someone who is an expert in, each
manager's specialized knowledge. We see here a number of directions for future
research. Some scholars might tinc! it rewarding to investigate better ways of eapturing
this knowledge. Also. future research may address the question of if the value of past
IPO experience is critical because entrepreneurial tlrms may avoid startup mistakes by
hiring managers with this experience (Dyke. Fischer. & Reuber, 1992). Or managers'
experience in related industries perhaps could be valuable to young lirllls, as could their
experience on the boards of other startups.
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Concluding Remarks
Much discussion has taken place in the management literature regarding the question
of whether slack resources are beneficial or detrimental to the success of a finn (e.g"
Bourgeois, 198 J; Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Cyert & March, I 963!l 992; Singh. 1986). Our
work aimed to demonstrate the importance of slack resources in a different context. In
short. we would like to reiterate that recognizing the effect of slack resources on IPO finn
valuation is not only theoretically important but also practically significant. Our flndings

show that financial, managerial, und innovational slack provides signals to investors about
the quality of the firlll and its future performance potential.
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